A Fissile Material Delimitation Treaty (FMCT) is a planned international agreement that would prohibit the production of the two main constituents of nuclear weapons: highly enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium. These issues were discussed at the United Nations Conference on Disarmament (CD), a 65-member body that was the only multilateral forum for disarmament negotiations. The CD works by mutual agreement and often stagnates, hindering the progress of an FMCT. The scope of a CMF An important problem that needs to be resolved in the negotiations is the scope of an FMCT – the facilities and equipment to which the verification application would be applied. There are two fundamental options. One way forward would be to negotiate a treaty of considerable scope. This would cover all nuclear facilities and nuclear materials, with the exception of non-prohibited military activities, such as ship propulsion and existing stockpiles of nuclear materials. The other option would be to seek a narrower contract, which would focus on the most proliferation-sensitive fissile material production facilities, i.e. reprocessing and enrichment facilities, and the corresponding production from those facilities. Attempts to extend the global security system to nuclear-weapon States and non-NPT states would pose serious problems.
It is impossible to apply truly comprehensive security measures for all nuclear materials in nuclear-weapon States and non-NPT States, since when the treaty enters into force, they are still allowed to dispose of nuclear weapons and to retain existing nuclear materials outside the scrutiny. In addition, the cost of the comprehensive model review would be very high in nuclear-weapon States. In light of these considerations and related considerations, Australia concluded that nuclear-weapon states and non-nuclear-weapon States would need a separate and separate verification system from the CSST. These States, like non-nuclear-weapon States, would commit not to produce fissile material for nuclear weapons, but the review approach would be better suited to their particular circumstances. As a result, Australia has proposed a „targeted“ approach. One aspect would be the monitoring of fissile material production facilities such as uranium enrichment and reprocessing facilities. The other would be to check whether fissile material subject to an FMCT system – cut plutonium, uranium-233, HEU and separate neptunium produced after the treaty came into force – are actually used for peaceful or non-prohibited purposes. This would require verification measures at downstream facilities that process these materials after production. In addition, an FMCT verification regime must include measures to detect potential undeclared production facilities. The treatment of previous fissile material production, i.e.
existing stocks at the time the contract came into force, is an important issue that is fundamental both to the content of an FMCT and to the prospects for successful negotiations.
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